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Abstract: This paper examines the career and contribution of J. K. Gifford 
(1899–1987), the Foundation Professor of Economics and first Head of the 
Department of Economics at the University of Queensland, and one of the first in 
Australia to write an introductory textbook. Gifford’s publications were often 
poorly written and with few references. They focussed mainly on monetary theory 
and inflation and towards the end of his career concentrated on challenging the 
notion of a wage-price spiral. Much of his work on the ‘cost-push fallacy’ seems to 
have been based on a crude kind of monetarist thinking: governments were prone to 
allow monetary growth to sustain high profit levels that businesses enjoyed in an 
inflationary environment. However, his policy proposals were not those of the free-
market Right and focussed on safeguarding employees’ interests by ensuring that 
their wages increased at the rate of inflation plus productivity growth, thereby 
limiting the scope for employers to benefit from inflation. Although he saw the 
money supply as exogenous and prone to be mismanaged by governments, he did 
not articulate a model of the demand for money or defend the stability of the 
velocity of circulation. His most important article, a brief paper in the Journal of 
Political Economy in 1968, came about from his objections to the original Phillips 
analysis, and argued that correlation does not establish causation. Precisely this 
argument could also be levelled against the monetarist thinking of Milton Friedman 
and it was not long before the paper’s basic argument was used by Nicholas Kaldor 
in this way. 
 
1 Introduction 
Very few Australian economists have published in the Journal of Political 
Economy; down to 1968 there had been only four of them.2 J. K. Gifford’s 
‘Correlationism: A Virulent Disease in Economic Science’, which appeared in the 
‘Miscellany’ section of the September–October 1968 issue of the Chicago journal, 
was therefore a significant personal achievement. This five-page article, which was 
by far John King Gifford’s best published work, was also his last, as the Research 
Professor and first Head of the Department of Economics at the University of 
Queensland retired in the following year.3 ‘A disease is spreading in economic 
writing’, Gifford began, ‘on the subject of inflation of the price level in times of 
rising output. The disease is the misuse of correlation measures to explain causal 
relations’ (Gifford 1968, p. 1091). He cited three papers on aggregate wage 
determination as symptoms of the disease: one Australian (Hancock 1966), one 
using British data (the classic study by Phillips 1958) and one from the US 
(Eckstein and Wilson 1962). All three claimed that statistical evidence of 
correlation between money wage growth and unemployment (together with certain 
other variables) explained the rate of wage inflation in their respective three 
countries. This, Gifford objected, was fallacious. ‘It would be quite inappropriate to 
suggest that a theory of causal relations could be confirmed by a single high 
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coefficient of determination, obtained by means of a regression equation’, which 
could establish only the ‘degree of correspondence’ between the variables under 
review (ibid., pp. 1091-2). 
‘Some statisticians and economists’, Gifford continued, ‘when they use the 
word “explain” in this technical sense, use apologetic quotation marks, but this 
does not excuse the misleading use of the word in economic science, where 
explanation usually means revealing relations of cause and effect’ (ibid., p. 1093). 
Taking as an example the popular textbook by M. R. Spiegel (1961), Gifford 
criticised the way in which statisticians defined the ‘coefficient of determination’ as 
the ratio of the ‘explained variation’ to the ‘total variation’ in the dependent 
variable. It would be less misleading, he argued, if r were renamed the ‘coefficient 
of quantitative relation’, defined as the ratio of the ‘related variation’ to the total 
(‘related’ plus ‘unrelated’) variation. Correlation exercises were no substitute for 
the time-honoured economic principle, ‘other things being equal’. But this was 
denied by ‘some economists’ (whom Gifford did not name), who: 
… argue that science can only measure and predict. They seem 
to suggest that science is nothing more than a testing of 
hypotheses by correlation studies and that the hypothesis that 
can best predict by means of a measure of correlation is the 
nearest to the truth. This treacherous suggestion must be 
resisted by a clear statement that not even perfect correlation 
can prove a false hypothesis. (Gifford 1968, p. 1094; original 
stress) 
The harmful disease of correlationism must therefore be resisted, Gifford 
concluded, by a ‘strenuous and continued effort … through all learned economic 
societies’ (ibid., p. 1093). 
Gifford himself was deeply engaged in this effort. ‘Correlationism’ was in 
fact the culmination of his ten-year crusade against the theory of cost-push 
inflation, which he had begun in Australia and then taken to Europe and the United 
States. John King Gifford’s crusade against the fallacy of a wage-price spiral is the 
subject of this paper. We shall argue that Gifford had an appreciation of monetary 
theories of inflation before any other Australian economist, but that his 
understanding of the issues was incomplete and ultimately totally unsatisfactory. 
The paper is divided into four parts. The first briefly touches upon the 
details of Gifford’s life and early career, including his exposure to the ideas of the 
Kiel school in the early 1930s. The second part summarises the macroeconomics of 
his Economics for Commerce (1942). The third and by far the longest part of the 
paper focusses upon Gifford’s 1960s views on wage-push inflation and his long 
(and unsuccessful) campaign to win publicity for his views on inflation. The fourth 
part of the paper assesses Gifford’s place in the inflation literature and asks whether 
he really was Australia’s first monetarist. We conclude that he was not. 
2 Gifford’s Early Career 
John (Liddle) King Gifford4 was born on 12 March 1899 in New York, where his 
family had migrated shortly before. However, Gifford’s family returned to Wishaw, 
Scotland, where John spent his formative years. He served with the Royal Flying 
Corps during the First World War. Always an energetic man, Gifford resumed his 
studies, completing an MA with first-class honours in economics at the University 
of Glasgow, where he was taught by W. R. Scott. Gifford undertook some early 
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research into monetary problems while at Glasgow. He was also adept at French 
and German. He taught teachers and adults through the Workers’ Educational 
Association and the Reid Stuart Fellowship at Glasgow University. 
In 1923 he applied for the post of lecturer in economics and history at 
Queensland University. Gifford emphasised in his application that he was ‘specially 
qualified to lecture on the practical side of Economics’. It was no idle boast. 
Gifford was, in every respect, a product of Scotland’s then tradition of churning out 
graduates versed in political economy. Scholars like Scott inculcated in their 
students the notion that applied work is not inferior to theory and indeed that a 
focus upon application actually influences and improves upon the theory being 
constructed. Throughout his life Gifford held that economics was a practical 
science like engineering and that economists had to observe the world of work. 
This approach was integral to the political economy tradition Gifford was trained 
in. It was an approach that upheld the role of history and institutions and 
emphasised presenting policy-related analysis to policy-makers in accessible form 
(Dow, Dow and Hutton 2000, p. 194; Dow and Hutton 2006). 
Under the watchful eye of Professor Henry Alcock, Gifford took the first-
year classes in economics at the University of Queensland, and also lectured in 
British history. Alcock had replaced Edward Shann, who, along with G. Elton 
Mayo, had been the first lecturers in the Department of History and Economic 
Science that was established in 1911 (Kenwood and Lougheed 1997, p. 1). In 1930 
Gifford applied for a Rockefeller scholarship and sent his application to the local 
representative, D. B. Copland, Dean of the Faculty of Commerce at Melbourne 
University. Copland approved it, given Gifford’s expertise in monetary economics 
and his knowledge of the Australian banking system. Awarded a scholarship in 
1930, Gifford, after exploring possibilities with Copland, who had an extensive 
range of contacts, settled for the Institute for World Economics in Kiel, where he 
spent nineteen months studying the relationship between the business cycle and the 
price level.5 
His mentors in Kiel were Gerhard Colm and Hans Neisser. Colm was 
already well known as a public finance theorist, while Neisser specialised in 
monetary economics. In his 1928 PhD thesis on ‘The Exchange Value of Money’ 
he took an orthodox Quantity Theory line, and was praised both by Friedrich von 
Hayek and by John Maynard Keynes in the Treatise on Money, which described 
Neisser as one of the leading neo-Wicksellian monetary theorists (Keynes 1930, 
p. 178). By 1931, when Neisser published a book on The Circulation of Money, his 
position was more nuanced. Concentrating on the analysis of the velocity of 
circulation, he now denied any strict separation of the monetary and real sectors of 
the economy, and argued that causation ran both ways, from money to output and 
employment, but also in the reverse direction. Distinguishing ‘income deposits’ 
from ‘business deposits’, Neisser now revealed the influence on his thinking of 
both Karl Marx and Keynes, and showed more interest in the long-run question of 
the effect of technical progress on the price level than in the short-run problems of 
the business cycle (Hagemann 1997, pp. 306-9).6 Gifford enjoyed the experience of 
working with Colm and Neisser. He told Copland that he was getting on well with 
both. Gifford reported that Neisser had just written two ‘brilliant’ articles on the 
international money market before the war and that they would ‘form an excellent 
foundation for part of the work I am doing’. Copland was happy to learn that 
Gifford had found ‘a kindred spirit in Dr. Neisser’.7 
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Undoubtedly Gifford was strongly influenced by Neisser, but it is not clear 
whether it was the simple Quantity Theorist of 1928 or the more sophisticated 
monetary economist of 1931 who left the stronger mark. When the Nazis took 
power Gifford’s mentors were hounded from their positions, and he himself spent 
the last months of his two-year sabbatical in Paris and London. Gifford’s research 
focussed on whether the French central bank policy of trying to prevent a rise in the 
price level during a boom had any effect on the global economy, particularly on 
debt-laden countries like Australia. Some of that research later appeared as a book 
on Britain’s 1931 devaluation and the advisability of a return to the Gold Standard 
(Gifford 1934). He acknowledged the assistance of Colm, Neisser, Jacob 
Marschack and Gerhard Meyer of the Institut für Socialforschung in Geneva. In 
principle, Gifford argued, fixed exchange rates were best, since they reduced 
uncertainty. The 1931 devaluation of sterling had been unsuccessful for Britain, 
since it had provoked competitive depreciation and increased protection in other 
countries. For the world economy it had been disastrous, intensifying the 
deflationary pressures in many trading nations. A return to the original parity was, 
however, impossible, since the deflationary consequences for the British economy 
would be severe. Gifford therefore recommended a return to the Gold Standard, but 
at the new, post-devaluation exchange rate. The book was favourably reviewed in 
the Economic Journal (Barger 1934). 
When Gifford returned to Australia he recommended a ‘moderate credit 
expansion to stimulate industry and cause the absorption of the unemployed’ even 
if it meant some devaluation of the Australian pound (Gifford 1935, p. 77). The 
advice was well received by other Australian economists at the time. Equally, when 
he presented evidence before the Royal Commission on the Money and Banking 
Systems in 1936, it was inspired by Keynes’ General Theory. He told the 
Commission: ‘I have been influenced by Mr. Keynes’s way of thinking for a 
number of years and I was very pleased to see the recent development of his theory 
in his last book’.8 In his Statement Gifford swept aside the boom-bust trade-cycle 
views of Hayek and Ludwig von Mises and articulated a hydraulic version of 
Keynes’ new schema and its policy implications. Consequently, Gifford was bolder 
than both E. R. Walker and W. B. Reddaway in taking the line that the central bank 
should keep the economy in semi-boom without fomenting inflation. He was, in 
short, an ardent expansionist, and attracted Commissioner Ben Chifley’s attention 
by advocating massive credit creation to counter a slump (Robinson 1986, p. 133).9 
A few years later Gifford accused some of his colleagues of being economic 
Jeremiahs. He was annoyed that a ‘boom control’ policy, elements of which were 
apparent in both Australia and America, drove down share prices and made 
business confidence precarious. The motivation behind this form of economic 
‘wowserism’, Gifford held, was the fear that some sectors of the economy would 
over-develop if the boom persisted.10 Consequently the boom had to be checked 
because of the inherent imbalances in the economy. Doing this, however, would 
throw the economy back into depression. 
3 Economics for Commerce 
Gifford was one of the first Australian economists to prepare a text for first-year 
students. His textbook Economics for Commerce, published in 1942, was a massive 
(407-page), rambling, long-winded and idiosyncratic text that put great emphasis 
on monetary problems. For the most part it reflected the sort of political economy 
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training that Gifford would have received in Glasgow in the early 1920s, and made 
little reference to subsequent developments in the discipline. Thus, in the eleven 
chapters (III-XIII) on microeconomics, there is almost no mention of either 
imperfect or monopolistic competition,11 and no reference to the work of Edward 
Chamberlin or Joan Robinson, or even to more popular works like the short 
Cambridge Economic Handbooks written by Dennis Robertson and Austin 
Robinson. The seven chapters on macroeconomics (II, XV-XX) are notable for 
their total neglect of Keynes, whose name does not appear in the index. 
Instead Gifford states ‘the price-level law’ in the following terms: 
A rise in all prices cannot take place except as a result of a 
decline in the sales of each commodity or an increase in the flow 
of money towards it. A rise in the average price level must be 
due either to a decline in the average volume of goods sold or to 
an increase in the flow of money; a fall in the average level of 
prices must be due either to an increase in the average volume of 
sales, or to a decrease in money flow. (Gifford 1942, p. 275) 
Note that it is the flow of money expenditure, not the stock of money, which does 
all the work in Gifford’s price-level law. This is entirely consistent with a 
rudimentary (and unstated) Keynesian income-expenditure analysis, and also with 
an aggregate demand-aggregate supply model of output and inflation. Similarly, 
Gifford’s discussion of ‘monetary influences on business activity’ is articulated in 
terms of ‘the flow of money’ rather than the stock (p. 290). He does, however, state 
that: 
… changes in the total of money payments are likely to be due 
as a rule to changes in the quantity of active money. If the 
volume of goods sold remained the same, we should expect the 
price level to vary in ordinary times very closely in proportion 
to the changes in the quantity of active money. (ibid., p. 289) 
This is (almost) a statement of the Quantity Theory, but with two significant 
qualifications, both drawn perhaps from his reading of Neisser. The first is the 
reference to ‘ordinary times’ and the second is the restriction of the argument to the 
quantity of ‘active money’. Presumably, then, for Gifford the Quantity Theory does 
not apply in extraordinary times (a severe depression), when hoarding increases 
and the proportion of inactive money is correspondingly greater. At a stretch all this 
could be interpreted as an oblique endorsement of Keynes’ theory of liquidity 
preference. A safer conclusion might be that Gifford’s thinking on monetary 
questions was more than a little muddled―or at least his exposition of it was. 
On policy questions Gifford was on stronger ground, arguing that an anti-
depression or ‘boom control’ policy was sustainable by systematically varying the 
flow of money: ‘After one depression has been minimized by an anti-depression 
policy of expanding the flow of money we can confidently try to prolong the 
following boom as long as possible, relying on an anti-depression policy of 
maintaining and gradually expanding the flow of money, to minimize any 
depression which may threaten the future’ (ibid., p. 203). His treatment of 
socialism, government control of industry and the relationship between economics 
and politics, although very brief, is clear and dispassionate (ibid., pp. 390-2). 
As we shall see, Gifford seems to have justified his neglect of 
contemporary developments by claiming that the new, Keynesian macroeconomics 
would be too difficult for the average Australian commerce student to understand. 
This was a very dubious proposition. Simple, non-technical accounts of the 
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Keynesian system were already available overseas, including James Meade’s 
Introduction to Economic Analysis and Policy (1936) and Joan Robinson’s 
Introduction to the Theory of Employment (1937), either of which could have 
served as a model for Gifford to follow. It is not as if he was defending an 
avowedly anti-Keynesian viewpoint. On the evidence of Economics for Commerce, 
he was simply not very comfortable with any of the recent innovations in economic 
theory, either micro or macro. 
Frank Mauldon, who reviewed the book for the Economic Record, 
described it thus: ‘The whole exposition of Economics for Commerce finds its 
focus in the relations between buyers and sellers and in the effects upon economic 
activity of changes in the supply of money for their transactions’. Mauldon 
interpreted the latter parts of the book as indicating that fluctuations in the business 
cycle were entirely monetary in origin. In his review he quoted a passage from 
Gifford that captured the orientation of the text: ‘Not one of the causes which have 
been assigned for booms, such as good harvests, new inventions, over optimism, 
etc, could cause a boom if there were no increase in the flow of money. Each one of 
the causes assigned for the trade depression, such as a shock to business 
confidence, bad harvests, over-development in certain industries, etc exerts its 
influence through a decline in the flow of money; if by counteracting means, 
money flow could be made to rise sufficiently, a general trade depression would not 
appear’. Mauldon (1942, p. 237) was concerned that, despite Gifford’s ‘sincerity’ in 
constructing a principles text, he had not ‘in the present transitional stage of 
monetary and cycle theory made his audience aware of the other major divergences 
in theoretical approach’. By that Mauldon presumably meant Hayek’s theory of the 
business cycle. Mauldon also felt the text would prove too difficult for first-year 
students, partly because of Gifford’s idiosyncratic prose. This was a point made 
also by George Brown of the University of Chicago in his review in the Journal of 
Political Economy. Brown wrote that students would find it difficult to compare 
Gifford’s text with other intermediate texts because of its practical focus and 
because of the ‘special language’ used in the text. Plainly, it was ‘not for the 
uninitiated’. He noted, too, that the text ‘reflected the personality of its author’ 
(Brown 1943, p. 366). 
Colin Clark, then the Director of the Queensland Bureau of Industry, wrote 
a glowing review of the book for the Bureau’s circular, Economic News. Clark felt 
that Gifford’s text was ‘among the best’ of first-year texts in that it presented 
economic discourse in a non-technical, non-mathematical way. This was 
appropriate given that most of those then reading economics were Arts students or 
came from a business background. Clark noted how Gifford had simplified 
economics for greater appeal. ‘The distinguishing characteristic’ of the text, 
however, according to Clark (1942, p. 2), was its ‘tremendous emphasis’ upon 
monetary problems. Gifford apparently wanted to tell students that the sole cure for 
the global economy’s problems lay with monetary policy. 
In a subsequent letter to the University of Queensland Registrar, though, 
written on Gifford’s behalf to further his case for promotion to Professor, Clark was 
far more critical of the textbook and the pedagogical approach it portrayed. Clark 
wrote that Gifford ‘attached particular importance’ to ‘the Theory of Money’. He 
reported that Gifford: 
… teaches his subject in what appears to me a crude and simple 
manner – or, shall we say, in the manner in which Lord Keynes 
would have taught it twenty five years ago. He replies on the 
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other hand that the average student, and the general public 
outside, are incapable of understanding present day refinements 
of monetary theory, and indeed might be led to highly 
erroneous conclusions from an inadequate study thereof. I am 
inclined to think that he gives too much attention altogether to 
the theory of money. On the other hand, he contends that 
inflation and depression are both extremely burning issues, and 
that it is better that his students should get some grasp of these 
problems, even if other aspects of economic science have to be 
put into the background. 
After thus damning him with faint praise Clark recommended him for promotion, 
given that Gifford had some research capability, was in touch with economists 
overseas, and was ‘a man of wide general culture … with a mind well rooted in 
history, literature and kindred branches of knowledge’.12  
While continuing his university duties, Gifford was recruited in 1942 to 
work with the Department of War Organisation of Industry on a part-time basis. In 
1945 Gifford sought leave to work full-time in the post, which was now concerned 
with postwar reconstruction. Visiting factories, he argued, allowed him to obtain 
useful experience in practical economics. He returned to university life in 1946 and 
was appointed associate professor. 
He now pushed the idea of a separate department of economics. Gifford’s 
wishes were granted in 1950 when he became Foundation Professor and the first 
Head of the Economics Department (Kenwood and Lougheed 1997, p. 7). As the 
department became more professionalised, more staff were recruited. Helen Hughes 
was offered a lectureship in economic history in 1961 (Kenwood and Lougheed 1997, 
p. 12). She left two years later to join the Australian National University, distinctly 
unimpressed with the leadership provided by Gifford. She told John Lodewijks: 
I found Queensland’s Department of Economics under John 
Gifford was umpteenth rate … I did something useful for the 
Queensland Economics Department. We managed to have 
Gifford moved to a research chair and a new head of 
Department appointed. Jon Pincus was by far the best student 
the Queensland Economics Department had ever seen. The 
final honours essay examination was on inflation on which 
Gifford had very peculiar views. Jon demolished them. George 
Palmer, Bruce McFarlane and I realised Jon’s essay was 
outstanding, but that if Gifford saw it, he would fail Jon. We sat 
around wondering what to do. In the end I tore the essay up, 
threw it into the waste paper basket and suggested that we 
would say that we had lost it, a frequent occurrence in that 
shambolic Department. (Lodewijks 2007, p. 437) 
Too busy completing his unsupervised honours thesis, Pincus was 
‘blissfully unaware’ of the trouble his exam script caused. He did recall, however, 
organising a debate within the department on the validity of cost-push inflation―a 
debate Pincus believes Gifford won by insisting that inflation was a monetary 
phenomenon ultimately validated by an increase in the supply of money.13 Offered 
a lectureship at the university, Pincus, aware that the department was not at the 
cutting edge of research, opted for a senior tutorship at Monash. Another young 
undergraduate at the time, John Stanford, only encountered Gifford in his honours 
year and found him ‘quite odd’ and ‘old fashioned’ in terms of embracing new 
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monetary theory. Stanford also noted how Gifford was very dogmatic and regarded 
‘anyone who didn’t support his position 100% as an opponent’.14 
After ruling over the department until 1966, when Ronald Gates took over, 
Gifford was rewarded with a research professorship from which he retired in 1970 
after 44 years of service (Kenwood and Lougheed 1997, p. 16). The two-year 
discrepancy is explained by a short retirement in the late 1950s before Gifford 
returned to academe with a passion in tow. 
4 The Fallacy of Cost-Push Inflation 
In the 1960s Gifford embarked upon his last major research project, focussing upon 
the interplay between wages and productivity under Australia’s arbitration system 
and more generally on the validity of the supposed wage-price spiral. It would be 
the most fruitful period of his life, but arguably also the most frustrating. He seems 
to have published nothing of any scholarly significance between 1942 and 1961, 
when his Wages, Inflation, Productivity appeared.15 All the elements of his crusade 
are contained in this 163-page book. Its subtitle, ‘Adequate adjustment of wages, 
margins, salaries to inflation, productivity, prosperity’,16 indicates the author’s 
policy proposal, which was to hold constant the labour share in national income by 
ensuring that money wages increased at the same rate as the productivity growth 
rate plus the rate of price inflation. This simple steady-state rule of wages policy 
appears not to have been widely understood in Australia in the early 1960s, and 
Gifford never really set it out as widely as he might have done. Neither did he 
consider the modifications that would be necessary outside a steady state, when the 
prevailing rate of price inflation was deemed to be too high and action was required 
to reduce it, as for example in the early years of the Accord in the mid-1980s. 
Gifford also failed to explain that his policy rule was only very loosely 
related to the analytical theme of his book, which was a refutation of what he 
termed ‘the wages-prices-spiral fallacy’ (Gifford 1961, p. 17). This was a variant of 
the then fashionable theory of cost-push (or wage-push) inflation, according to which: 
(1) Wages rise, consumers have more money to spend and cost 
of production rises: therefore prices rise. (2) Because of the rise 
in the cost of living, wages rise again, consumers have more 
money to spend and cost of production rises: therefore prices 
rise. And so on, in an unending spiral. (ibid., p. 17; original 
stress) 
This was what Gifford termed the ‘naive’ version of the theory, and it foundered on 
the objection that ‘No long-continued rise in the price level can happen without 
continued monetary expansion which causes rises in both wages and the prices of 
goods’. A ‘more complicated’ version of the fallacy was ‘based on the assumption 
of an “elastic money supply”’. According to ‘some economists’ (who are not 
named), ‘wage increases lead to an expansion of money spent and to a rise in the 
price level, which in turn is followed by more wage increases and so on’ (ibid., 
p. 18). Gifford rejected this version of the argument on the grounds that it let the 
monetary authorities off the hook: 
It is a very poor expository device to think of money supply as 
being entirely passive, when in a modern economy it is one of 
the parts of a dominating element in the situation, namely 
government monetary and fiscal policy, and when we can have 
any one of several kinds of deliberately adopted policy. 
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 Governments which control monetary conditions, are limited 
in their powers to stimulate production, but their influence on 
monetary conditions is paramount; they can cause inflation, slow 
or fast, and they can stabilize the price level. (ibid., p. 19) 
There was also a third, ‘sophisticated’ version of the argument, where the 
supposed sequence of events was as follows: money wages are raised, which 
increases unemployment, which induces governments that are committed to full 
employment to react ‘by a further touch of monetary inflation’, thereby increasing 
the money demand for goods and causing a ‘wages-monetary inflation-price spiral’. 
Gifford objected that this version ‘still suggests that that one could stop inflation by 
freezing wages, which is not true’ (ibid., p. 20), and it is still much too kind to the 
monetary authorities: 
Governments, at any time, tend to be inflationist in policy 
because it makes finance so much easier for them. They are 
being encouraged, however, at the present moment, by those 
‘political’ economists who advocate a rapid rate of capital 
development and think that it can be helped by gradual 
inflation. (ibid., p. 21) 
It would be tempting to interpret all this, from a twenty-first century 
perspective, as an impressive early defence of monetarism. After all, Gifford did 
view inflation as essentially a monetary phenomenon, and he did regard the money 
supply as an exogenous variable controlled by the monetary authorities. On both 
counts he was opposed to what would become the anti-monetarist, Post Keynesian 
position, in which inflation is essentially a labour market phenomenon and the 
money supply is endogenously determined by the decisions of banks and their 
customers and cannot be controlled by the authorities (Arestis and Sawyer 2006). 
This temptation must, however, be resisted. For one thing, Gifford cited none of the 
relevant literature, and was perversely proud of the fact.17 More importantly, his 
own theoretical position was so loosely expressed that it could be interpreted quite 
fairly as a rather unsatisfactory statement of the orthodox Keynesian version of 
demand-pull inflation. Gifford’s ‘monetary method concentrates attention on the 
totality of the situation, the total amount of money spent versus the total amount of 
things sold for money’. ‘With the help of the monetary method’, Gifford wrote, ‘it 
is easy to see that the level of prices is determined not merely by the comparative 
scarcity or plenty of goods, but to an equal extent by the total amount of money 
spent’ (ibid., p. 13). This is more or less how he had set out his ideas in Economics 
for Commerce, and it is entirely consistent with the aggregate demand-aggregate 
supply approach that Keynes had used in the early chapters of the General Theory 
and that was a common expository device in many textbook versions of the so-called 
neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis. There is nothing obviously monetarist about it. 
Gifford’s analysis of Australian monetary statistics actually pointed him in 
an anti-monetarist direction. The velocity of circulation had fluctuated sharply after 
1938-9, he reported, falling by 1944-5 to 57% of its prewar level before recovering 
to 116% of that level by 1959-60. As he noted, ‘some of the newly created bank 
money in those years was lying idle waiting for a convenient way of investing it or 
spending it on consumer goods. The existence of this idle (or hoarded) money was 
one of the great difficulties facing the government in its attempts to stop inflation’ 
(ibid., p. 16). There is no suggestion here of a stable money demand function à la 
Milton Friedman (but also no indication from Gifford that he recognised the 
theoretical, as opposed to the policy, significance of these data). 
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The remainder of Gifford’s career was dedicated to his crusade against the 
fallacy of cost-push inflation, and academically the 1960s were by far his most 
productive decade. In 1962 he published only his second paper in the Economic 
Record (it was also to be his last). ‘Economic science has been invaded recently’, 
he began the article, ‘by a number of new technical terms; it is respectfully 
suggested that some of them are so confusing that it is reasonable to call them 
wicked words’ (Gifford 1962, p. 63; this was by analogy with the writings of the 
British humorist A. P. Herbert). The wicked words were the expression of wicked 
ideas. ‘The wicked words are “inflation” used as synonymous with “rise in the 
price level”, “demand inflation”, “cost inflation”, and “pure cost inflation”. The 
wicked ideas are the “wages-prices spiral” and an “elastic money supply”, both of 
which are associated with fallacious argument’ (ibid., p. 63). Once again Gifford 
cited not a single source and (apart from Herbert) named no names. His argument 
was exactly the same as that in Wages, Inflation, Productivity, but the (implied) 
anti-monetarism was now even more clearly stated: ‘In explaining a rise in the price 
level, it is better to think usually of “money spent” instead of money supply, 
because it is money spent, and not money supply, which directly influences the 
price level’ (ibid., p. 65). 
Two years later Gifford tried to convince the industrial relations profession 
of the justice of his case, arguing in the Journal of Industrial Relations that the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission had been right to reject 
the employers’ submission in the 1964 basic wage case. If it had been adopted by 
the Commission, the employers’ ‘total wage plan’ would have disadvantaged 
employees, since it would have restricted money wage increases to the rate of 
productivity growth, ‘cutting out cost-of-living supplements’ (Gifford 1964, 
p. 264). The plan, Gifford noted, had been supported by a number of prominent 
economists, including Nicholas Kaldor (1964) and Richard Manning and Joe Isaac 
(1961), but ‘it would certainly be unacceptable to trade unions if appreciable 
demand inflation took place’ (Gifford 1964, p. 265).18 He set out his own 
‘prosperity wage and salary plan’, which was identical to the one that he had 
proposed in 1961: in normal circumstances money wages should increase by the 
sum of productivity growth and price inflation. ‘A safe limit can be set to annual 
general-prosperity increases by adopting the following principle: they should not be 
raised high enough to cause unemployment’ (ibid., p. 267). Implicit in Gifford’s 
proposal―but again not stated explicitly or given any justification―was the 
concept of a steady-state economy with full employment and constant relative 
shares of labour and capital. Gifford’s plan was almost identical to that put forward 
by E. A. Russell (1965) and articulated by Wilfred Salter (1959) in his evidence 
before the Arbitration Court in the 1959 Basic Wage case. 
In 1965 Gifford was invited to give the annual lecture endowed by the 
English, Scottish and Australian Bank, which always assumed some monetary 
dimension or theme. He used the opportunity to denounce the Commission’s recent 
majority judgment on the basic wage, which ‘will become quite a classic example 
of how policy can be adversely affected by bad theory’ (Gifford 1965, p. 1). 
Despite increasing productivity and low and declining unemployment, the 
Commission had decided to freeze the basic wage, allowing its real value to fall. 
The decision reflected a mistaken belief in the fallacious notion of cost-push 
inflation, and this in turn resulted from a failure to ‘understand correctly the 
working of cause and effect in this field’ (ibid., p. 21) and a consequent ‘misuse 
[of] the fundamental tool of economic science, “other things being equal”’ (ibid., 
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p. 21). The seeds of ‘Correlationism’ can be seen in this lecture, in which Gifford 
also noted that the Commission’s new policy would have a particularly serious 
adverse effect on public sector workers. 
Setting out his argument in ten propositions about wages and inflation, 
Gifford condemned the ‘wage-inflation theorists’ for providing unwarranted 
political support to the employers. Reducing the real value of the basic wage was: 
… bound to bring the whole system of wage fixation into 
disrepute, and will drive the trade unions to abandon 
arbitration, and to move strongly for price and profit control 
and the nationalization of many industries. The employers may 
find they have made a very short-sighted bargain in backing the 
theory of wage inflation and its associated policy of wage 
restraint. (ibid., p. 24) 
Gifford concluded by saying that ‘a world movement’ was needed to clarify 
people’s thinking on the theory of wages and bring inflation theory into harmony 
with the basic principles of demand and supply, the theory of money and the price 
level. He proposed a two-man public exploratory discussion in an effort to speed up 
the process of explaining and possibly resolving points of difference among the 
world’s economists on the issue.19 He would probably have volunteered his own 
services, telling his students in the early 1960s how he had challenged Paul 
Samuelson to debate him on the legitimacy of the wages–prices spiral. According 
to Gifford, Samuelson had written back telling him that the proposed debate would 
not advance his career.20 Gifford would not let the matter rest, however. 
In the following year he published a 56-page pamphlet with the title 
Sharing Prosperity Through The Gifford Plan For Annual, General-Prosperity, 
Wage and Salary Increases by the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission. The Gifford Plan was intended to restore faith in the arbitration 
system, which its author believed to be ‘dying and likely to be replaced by 
collective bargaining, with the possibility of disastrous strikes’ (Gifford 1966, p. 1). 
The back cover of the pamphlet informed potential purchasers that it was 
‘recommended … for study and public discussion by the Administrative and 
Clerical Officers’ Association of the Commonwealth Public Service’, and inside 
Gifford set out the political implications of the rival theories of inflation: 
It is easy to prove, without fear of contradiction, that inflation 
(while output is increasing) is caused solely by the actions of 
the Commonwealth Government, which is encouraged by 
business men who are intoxicated by inflation profits. This 
theory, besides being a true theory, favours the employees’ 
interests and could be adopted by employees with the name 
‘government-inflation theory’, or it could be called the ‘profits-
inflation theory’ to counter the employers’ propaganda for the 
‘wage-inflation theory’. (ibid., p. 11) 
The Gifford Plan centred on a ‘double-adjustment’ of money wages at a rate of 
increase equal to price inflation plus productivity growth. In the final analysis this 
would benefit capital as much as labour, Gifford suggested. ‘The idea of sharing 
prosperity by means of wage and salary increases would win more firm support for 
the system of private enterprise and would undoubtedly strengthen it against the 
assaults of communist propaganda’ (ibid., p. 1). 
Gifford spent part of 1966 on sabbatical in Europe and America. In that 
year he published a lengthy article in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, which was then 
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edited by the eminent German macroeconomist Erich Schneider.21 This was yet 
another protracted attack on ‘the wage-inflation fallacy’, and concluded with a call 
for ‘a demand-inflationist counter-revolution’. Even by Gifford’s standards this was 
a very strange article. He cited only one source, albeit a very good one (Bowen 
1960), made almost no reference to the theory of money, and revealed not the 
slightest awareness that inflationary expectations, the natural rate of unemployment 
or the imminent acceleration of inflation that the monetarists were predicting might 
be relevant to his argument.22 
Gifford also won, indirectly, an invitation from Friedman to participate in a 
Money and Banking seminar at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1966.23 
Gifford asked Friedman and the organiser of the workshops, Albert Rees, whether 
there could be a more public broadcast of the issues Gifford wished to raise. He had 
in mind the ten propositions on wages and inflation from his ESA lecture the year 
before. Rees told Gifford that it was better to stick to the ‘less dramatic’ university 
seminar as the means to disseminate knowledge, since ‘our academic community 
[is] perhaps unduly suspicious of unusual modes of presentation and too likely to 
equate them with unsound views’.24 Friedman concurred, telling Gifford that the 
workshops were composed entirely of academics and research students.25 In his 
reply Gifford again attempted to enlist Friedman in some form of one-off public 
broadcast, saying that it would help ‘counteract the extreme political attitude of 
most economists in Australia’. Gifford further explained that seminars were a ‘great 
inspiration, but they don’t help enough in counteracting the political propaganda of 
the cost-inflationists’.26 Gifford closed by asking Friedman whether before 
committing himself to the venture, he might call upon him at his holiday abode in 
New Hampshire to see ‘what kind of person I am’.27 
While sharing Gifford’s ‘indignation’ about how craven people were in 
relation to the idea of cost-push inflation, Friedman rebuffed the idea of a ‘crash 
program of widespread publicity’. It was not feasible, Friedman told Gifford, ‘to 
have any big one-shot public discussions that will advance the matter by a quantum 
jump at once’.28 He felt that the better way to win over hearts and minds was by 
‘plugging away’ and presenting the correct view as the occasion arose. It is not 
known whether Gifford actually presented his work at the University of Chicago. 
He continued to write for an academic audience. In February 1967 Gifford 
sent a 31-page manuscript to Richard Kahn in Cambridge, with the punchy title 
‘Unemployment and its relation to demand expansion, retail prices, average 
employee earnings and legal minimum (award) wage rates in Australia 1948-49 to 
1964-65: A demonstration that the Phillips hypothesis and Phillips Curve are 
actively-misleading to students of economic science’.29 He told Kahn that he had 
been encouraged by Friedman and Robert Mundell to send the manuscript to the 
Journal of Political Economy, but it was never published (and was indeed quite 
unpublishable). Later in the same year Gifford’s textbook on Australian Banking 
appeared, co-authored with J. V. Wood. It was successful and ran into four editions. 
Interestingly, in the 1967 edition, Gifford used conventional terms to explain how 
monetary policy operates in a mixed economy. Co-authorship apparently could 
keep him on the straight and narrow. 
There followed ‘Correlationism’, which was Gifford’s swansong. This 
excellent short article bore almost no relation to the long empirical paper that he had 
sent to Kahn, but was in effect an elaboration of one paragraph in the (wrongly-titled) 
‘Summary’ section, in which Gifford had observed that ‘A close correlation between 
two things which are joint results of a common cause does nothing to explain the 
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causal connection of events’.30 This was the only mention in the 1967 draft of this 
crucial point. The final version of ‘Correlationism’ must have been very thoroughly 
edited by someone at the Journal of Political Economy, since by contrast with the 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv paper it was tightly written and convincingly argued. 
Gifford was simply not capable of writing like this on his own.31 
5 An Assessment 
Gifford won little if any support from the Australian economics profession. One 
senior economist whom we consulted, who remembered Gifford from this period, 
described him to us as ‘a nutter’, and another referred to him as ‘a bit of an 
embarrassment to the club’ and recalled that Richard Downing, the then editor of 
the Record, was criticised by his colleagues for publishing the 1962 paper. Gifford 
would indeed have tried the patience of a saint. With the sole exception of 
‘Correlationism’, his writing was long-winded and repetitive almost beyond belief. 
It was also unscholarly, with very few references to sources and little if any 
indication that he was familiar with the literature on inflation and monetary theory. 
This penchant for non-acclamation might have stemmed from Gifford’s training, 
and also from the practices of the time. It seems that the Australian economic 
profession repaid the backhanded compliment with extremely little citation of 
Gifford’s works.32 Analytically, he was unsophisticated in the extreme. Certainly 
Gifford was never a monetarist, for he never articulated a model of the demand for 
money, defended the stability of the velocity of circulation nor criticised Keynes’ 
theory of liquidity preference; still less did he defend Friedman’s notion of a 
‘natural rate’ of unemployment, or take any interest in the acceleration hypothesis 
that was associated with it. 
The basic arguments of the ‘Correlationism’ paper are sound enough: 
correlation does not entail causation, and explanation rather than prediction is the 
fundamental task of social science (Lawson 1997). But Gifford’s ideas on the 
nature of causality were crude in the extreme, entirely ignoring the already 
substantial philosophy of science literature on the topic (Simon 1968). He seems 
not to have seen the irony of his attack on instrumentalism appearing in the house 
journal of the Chicago school, whose methodological manifesto (Friedman 1953) 
was subject to precisely the same destructive critique. As for his insistence that 
wage increases must be accommodated by the monetary authorities if they were to 
remain effective, this was almost a platitude in the cost-inflation literature of the 
early 1960s (Bronfenner and Holzman 1964, pp. 64-5). 
More interesting than its analytical merits are the political implications of 
Gifford’s campaign. Unlike the Chicago monetarists, he was not a man of the free-
market Right. The government that he was accusing of sole responsibility for 
Australia’s inflation was that of Robert Menzies, and (as already noted) the 
pamphlet setting out the Gifford Plan was sponsored by the Administrative and 
Clerical Officers’ Association and supposedly written at a level that would make it 
intelligible to the union’s membership. Gifford’s crusade was supported by the 
Marxian economist Bruce Macfarlane (1968, p. 192), which is perhaps less 
surprising than it seems: Marxists have always been susceptible to the seductive 
charm of the Quantity Theory (Nelson 1999). In a final ironic twist, the basic 
argument of the ‘Correlationism’ paper would very soon be used against Friedman 
by one of Gifford’s earlier targets, the Cambridge Post Keynesian Nicholas Kaldor, 
who launched his own sixteen-year crusade against ‘the scourge of monetarism’ on 
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the basis that money was endogenous and causation ran from real variables to 
monetary variables, and not vice versa (Kaldor 1970, 1982). 
Once Gifford retired from the University of Queensland in 1969 he seems 
to have lost all interest in economics. Instead he took up photography. Thus he did 
not comment on the wages explosion of 1973-4 or criticise the Reserve Bank and 
the Federal Treasury for their treatment of inflationary expectations. In 1973 
Queenslanders had an early exposure to monetarism when Friedman’s British 
disciple, Michael Parkin, a visiting scholar at the RBA, appeared on the ABC 
television show Monday Conference to explain in everyday language the new 
theory of inflation. It was televised live from a shopping centre in Brisbane (ABC 
1973). Gifford was not part of the audience, but he might have seen the irony of a 
monetarist crusade appearing almost on his doorstep. 
Gifford died on 20 October 1987 in Brisbane; there was no published 
obituary.33 He would have found it hard to explain the stagflation of the mid-1970s, 
but might perhaps have claimed to be vindicated by the eventual disappearance of 
cost inflation and the rise of explicit inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank in the 
decade after his death. There are few economists in the Australia of 2008 who 
would blame trade unions for the continuing inflation, or deny that inflation is 
always in the final analysis a monetary phenomenon that is controlled (or at least 
controllable) by the monetary authorities. More crank than proto-monetarist, 
Gifford may well have had the last laugh. 
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Notes 
 
1 The authors would like to thank participants at the 20th History of Economic 
Thought Society held at the University of Queensland in July 2007. We would also like 
to expressly thank Alan Duhs, Harald Hagemann, Ted Kolsen, John Lodewijks, 
Jonathan Pincus, John Stanford and two anonymous referees. 
2 They were Ronald Walker (1932 and 1943), Murray Kemp (1962), Richard Snape 
(1965) and Kelvin Lancaster (1966). 
3 Our Gifford, we hasten to point out, is entirely different from the English 
economist C. H. P. Gifford of Magdalene College, Cambridge, who published 
extensively in the Economic Journal in the 1930s. Ironically, C. H. P. Gifford published 
an article on the Brigden report in the Economic Record (1934). So far as we know, the 
two men were not related. 
4 For an unknown reason Gifford renounced the ‘Liddle’ in his name in 1937 
(J. K. Gifford to Records Clerk, University of Queensland, 11/10/1937, UQA S135 
Staff Files J. K. Gifford, University of Queensland). 
5 At an early stage Gifford proposed studying, under Theodore Gregory of London 
University, ‘the development of central banking generally … in countries where 
economic conditions are similar to those of Australia’. This is contained in a letter of 
Copland’s to J. V. Van Sichler of the Rockefeller Foundation in New York, 11/3/1930, 
FECC, Box 127, UMA. Incidentally, that same year Gregory came out to Australia, 
accompanying Sir Otto Niemeyer of the Bank of England in his official mission to 
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ascertain that nation’s ability to meet its financial debts to London. There is no evidence 
to suggest Gifford met up with Gregory. 
6 For more details of Neisser’s monetary thought see Hagemann (1990, 1999) and 
Trautwein (2003). In 1954 Neisser was a Fulbright lecturer at the University of 
Queensland (Hagemann 1999, p. 488). 
7 J. K. L. Gifford to D. B. Copland, 8/4/1932, and D. B. Copland to J. K. L. Gifford, 
16/5/1932, FECC, Group 1, 9/2a, Box 15, UMA. 
8 Royal Commission on the Monetary and Banking Systems: Minutes of Evidence 
Volume 2, p. 1199. 
9 Minutes of Evidence, RCMB, p. 1197. 
10 ‘Trade Booms: Control May Bring Depression’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
7/12/1937. The term ‘wowserism’ is Australian slang for being uptight or adopting a 
‘holier than thou’ mentality. 
11 The discussion in chapter XI is very largely confined to monopoly, with a brief 
mention of oligopoly. 
12 C. Clark to University Registrar, 21/11/1949, UQA S135 Staff Files J. K. Gifford. 
For the record, Gifford’s text, one of the first in Australia, was soon, like many other 
principles textbooks, displaced by Paul Samuelson’s Economics. 
13 Personal communication with the authors. 
14 Personal communication with the authors. 
15 He was, however, a frequent contributor to the press (see, for example, Gifford 
1951). 
16 Here Gifford is using ‘margin’ in the Australian industrial relations sense, to refer 
to an award wage rate in excess of the minimum or ‘basic wage’, for workers in skilled 
and professional occupations. It has no connection with profit margins. 
17 ‘It has been suggested to the author that he should give exact, checkable, quotations 
from writers who use such terms as “elastic money supply” and “cost inflation”. He asks 
to be excused on the ground that the use of these ideas is unfortunately widespread (they 
are used even by some of his own staff who should know better) and that it would be 
unfair to one or two persons to be cited now for the use of terms which will probably 
disappear from economic science before long’ (ibid., p. 18, fn12). Needless to say, there is 
also no reference to Friedman or any other monetarist. 
18 Interestingly, Gifford could not resist the use of this wicked word. 
19 ‘Inflation is in the hands of the Govt.’, Courier Mail [Brisbane], 14/10/1965, p. 25. 
20 We are indebted to Alan Duhs of the University of Queensland for this 
information. Duhs attended Gifford’s first-year economics lectures in 1963. 
21 On Schneider see Schäfer (1999). Unfortunately the archives of the journal at the 
University of Kiel contain no correspondence between Gifford and Schneider (Harmen 
Lehment, personal communication, 8 October 2007). 
22 There is a brief discussion of inflationary expectations, but only to allow Gifford 
to point out that ‘An expectation of inflation does not cause further inflation; but merely 
leads to an increase in the demand for loans; it would be followed by an increase in 
borrowing and spending, only if the government allowed it. An expectation of inflation 
can be disappointed by the government; any inflation following a wage increase is the 
result of government action in causing, or allowing, it and not the result of the wage 
increase’ (Gifford 1967, p. 31). 
23 J. K. Gifford to M. Friedman, 8/6/1966, Milton Friedman Papers, Folder 18, Box 27, 
Hoover Institution Archives (HIA). 
24 A. Rees to J. K. Gifford, 10/6/1966, Friedman Papers, Folder 18, Box 27, HIA 
25 M. Friedman to J. K. Gifford, 27/6/1966, Friedman Papers, Folder 18, Box 27, HIA. 
26 J. K. Gifford to M. Friedman, 7/7/1966, Friedman Papers, Folder 18, Box 27, HIA. 
27 Ibid. 
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28 M. Friedman to J. K. Gifford, 2/8/1966, Friedman Papers, Folder 18, Box 27, HIA. 
29 RRK/14/38, Richard Kahn Papers, King’s College, Cambridge. 
30 RFK/14/38/16 (p. 15 of the article). 
31 It would be interesting to know who refereed the paper, what they reported, and 
whether Milton Friedman was involved in the decision to publish it. Access to the 
Journal of Political Economy files at the University of Chicago’s Regenstein Library is 
restricted for 50 years (Andrew Baumann, Publications Manager, University of Chicago 
Press, personal communication, 11 April 2008). We can only surmise that Gifford’s 
welcome opposition to cost-push heresy was enough to overcome any misgivings about 
his methodological position. 
32 Take, as an example, Fred Gruen’s (1978) edited Surveys of Australian 
Economics. Volume One has a survey of wages policy by John Nieuwenhuysen and 
Judith Sloan. There are no references to Gifford’s works, nor are there any references to 
Gifford in the very next survey, on Inflation, by A. J. Hagger. 
33 Personal communication from J. K. Gifford’s grandson, David Gifford. 
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